

VZCZCXYZ0016
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #2151 3301427
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 261427Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8461

S E C R E T SANAA 002151

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [PGOV](#) [YM](#)
SUBJECT: BADAWI INTERVIEWS CONCLUDE -- TIME TO CONSIDER
NEXT STEPS

REF: A. SANAA 1989
[1](#)B. SANAA 1991

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (S) On November 26, a team of FBI investigators will conduct their final interview with convicted USS Cole bombing conspirator Jamal al-Badawi. With the end of these regular interviews, we now face the issue of how to ensure that Badawi remains in jail in Sana'a while inter-agency discussions continue regarding USG requirements to resolve this matter. Until now, the FBI interviews have acted as de facto verification visits. While the ROYG, up to and including President Saleh, has promised us continued access to Badawi, the details of the access have not been spelled out (reftels).

[1](#)2. (C) On November 26, the Ambassador met for approximately 40 minutes with Minister of Interior Rashad Mohamed al-Alimi. After thanking him for giving the FBI investigators access to Badawi, the Ambassador reiterated continuing USG interest in taking custody of the terrorist, notwithstanding Yemen's constitutional restrictions on extradition. The Ambassador then noted that, while discussions on ways to resolved the Badawi case continue, it is in the interests of both nations to examine ways to ensure that Badawi remains incarcerated. To that end, the Ambassador presented the Minister the following possibilities:

a) Use of an Electronic Monitoring Device

(C) The USG could offer to the ROYG the use of an electronic monitoring device like those used in the United States to keep prisoners under house arrest. These devices consist of a radio transmitter in a bracelet that attaches to a prisoner's ankle. This transmitter sends a regular message to a receiver that can be calibrated to determine if the individual wearing the bracelet is in a certain area. (Note: RSO indicates these devices can be accurate to within a few feet. End Note.) The bracelet is designed so that any attempt to remove it will be detectable. This would allow reliable monitoring of Badawi's location. This would likely still require visits to the prison to ensure the device had not been tampered with. The device should be installed and monitored by U.S. officials.

b) On-Demand Visits

(C) A specified number of visits each month with an agreed upon minimum required notice time (perhaps one hour) would allow us to effectively ensure Badawi's presence in the prison with an acceptable level of intrusion into the Yemeni prison system and an acceptable commitment of USG time and effort. (Comment. The most important issue with visits is

not that they be unlimited in number, rather that they be as close to unannounced as possible. An unlimited number of visits is useless if the ROYG has 48 hours to produce the prisoner. This would be sufficient time to find him and bring him to Sana'a for the visit. On the other hand, visits that would not allow the ROYG time to prepare would be effective even if they were limited in number. End Comment.)

The Minister said that he would pass the ideas on to senior security officials.

13. (C) Post will continue to press the ROYG for a suitable monitoring mechanism, and welcomes alternatives methods that may not have occurred to us.
SECHE